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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASSIFICATION OF STUDENTS BY RACE.-This was
was a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the Indianapolis Board of School Commissioners from erecting and maintaining a separate high school in that city
for the exclusive use of colored children. The complaint, in two paragraphs,
in substance alleges that such a classification is unlawful, because by it,
the colored children will be denied equal educational facilities, contrary to
the constitution of the United States, and as a result the city will become
embroiled in a multiplicity of suits, to be defended at the expense of the taxpayers. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint and denied the
injunction. Plaintiff appealed, held: Judgment affirmed. No constitutional question arises until some act or order denying colored children equal
opportunities or facilities, and until such an order, a tax-payers' suit for an
injunction is premature. Greathouse v. Board of School Com'rs of City of
Indianapolis, Sup. Ct. of Ind., March 31, 1926, 151 N. E. 411.
The complaint and decision in this case avoid direct consideration of
what seems to be the principal question, "Would plaintiff be deprived of his
property by the State, without due process of law, contrary to the 14th
Amend. of U. S. Const., in that the legislation, on which the classification
of colored students was based, was not a proper exercise of the police
power?" If the court had discussed this question it would have been decided against plaintiff as was the incidental question, "Whether or not colored citizens would be denied privileges or immunities of United States
citizenship, or due process of law, or equal protection of the law, by the
intended separate high school?" The court held, as quoted above, that no
such result was to be anticipated until some act or order concerning such
segregation. Upon the subject of privileges and immunities of United
States citizenship the court says: "The state must give to each citizen
of the United States who is or becomes a bona fide resident therein the same
rights, privileges and immunities secured by her Constitution." This doctrine is too broad and is contrary to the doctrine of the U. S. Supreme Court
as announced in the Slaughter-house Cases, 1873, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394,
which recognizes a difference between the privileges and immunities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to a citizen of the state as such. The latter are left to the state governments for
security and protection and only the former are placed under Federal protection. The privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amend. of the
U. S. Const. concerns only citizens of the United States and not citizens of
the several states, and did not transfer to the Federal Government the
responsibility of protecting citizens of a state from their own sovereign.
The right or privilege in question in the principal case, of equal educational
advantages, would seem to be a privilege of state citizenship rather than
of United States citizenship, to be protected, if at all, by the state. The
court was right in saying that, "Under the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Federal Constitution the state cannot deny to a citizen of the
United States, or deprive him of his national rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him as such citizen, and the state must recognize
as its citizen, any citizen of the United Stases who is or becomes a bona
fide resident therein. Slaughter-house CaseE, supra.
As to the Indiana law, the court held that the high schools are part of
the common school system, and as such they must be general, uniform, and
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equally open to all. Sec. 1, art. 8, Const. of Ind. The court said that, "Uniformity will be secured when all of the schools of the same grade have the
same system of government and discipline, the same branches of learning
taught, and the same qualifications for admission. The classification of
scholars on the basis of race or color, and their education in separate
schools, involve questions of domestic policy which are within the legislative
discretion and control, and do not amount to an exclusion of either class.
The Legislature has the power to provide for either separate or mixed
schools." Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738. The Legislature
by an act of 1869, amended in 1877, did provide for the organization of colored children into separate schools, with equal rights and privileges, and
provided against discrimination in cases where colored children were entitled to attend the same schools with white children. This is now the law
in Indiana, according to the principal case, for none of the subsequent statutes purport to repeal it. The court was right in saying that these statutes
do not violate the Federal Constitution, for segregation is not discrimination, if facilities to both colored and white are equal. Such segregation by
common carriers of passengers has been upheld whether done by authority
of statute or independently thereof. 10 Corpus Juris 804; Chiles V. Chesapeake, etc. R. Co., 218 U. S. 71, 54 L. Ed. 936, 30 Sup. Ct. 667. The protection which colored people of this country have against discrimination by
railway companies and others engaged in public callings, comes not by the
so-called slavery amendments to the Constitution of the United States but
from the law of public callings. Willis-Cases on Bailments and Public
Callings (2nd Ed.), Note p. 736. The points of pleading involved in this
case are relatively unimportant for the purposes of this note but justified
the decision that neither paragraph of the complaint stated a sufficient
C. F. R.
cause of action.
DEEDs-MINING LwB EsTATEs-In August, 1910, John M. Ireland, with
his wife, Elizabeth, joining, conveyed by warranty deed to his son, William
R. Ireland, appellant herein in fee simple remainder, a sixteen acre tract
of land of which he was the owner. The grantors reserved and retained
a life estate in each of them in the land so conveyed, and also, "The right
to mine and remove from said lands, in the ordinary and usual course of
mining, any coal, petroleum, oil, natural gas and minerals found therein,
and to appropriate and use as their own the proceeds of such mining without becoming in any manner accountable to the remainderman for waste."
John M. Ireland died prior to January 4, 1921, on which day his widow,
Elizabeth, entered into a written contract with the appellee company whereby she sold all the coal of vein No. 5 in and under said land, with the right
to mine and remove the same; she to receive four cents per ton for all coal
removed and a minimum of $500 per year. Appellant seeks to enjoin the
appellee from mining and removing the coal on the ground that Elizabeth
Ireland had no capacity by any form of conveyance to transmit to appellee
title to the coal in place. That she was merely a life tenant, and as such
she could have operated any mines in existence at the time of the execution
of the deed, in a reasonable way, but that she had no right to open new
mines or authorize others to do so. Appellee set up the deed to appellant,
and the agreement with Elizabeth Ireland. Appellant demurred. held:
Judgment for appellee affirmed. Ireland v. Francisco Mining Co. Decided
in the Indiana Appellate Court, May 11, 1926, 151 N. E. 700.

RECENT CASE NOTES
In deciding the case the court says: "The intention of the parties in
the execution of deeds and other like instruments must control. The intention must primarily be gathered from a fair consideration of the entire
instrument and the language employed therein, and should be consistent
with the terms thereof, including its scope and the subject matter involved.
Here it was clearly the intention of the parties that the grantors should
have the right to mine and remove the coal from the land, in the ordinary
and usual course of mining, without being in any manner accountable to
appellant for waste." There is no doubt that this case is strictly in accord
with the present law as to construing deeds. Elsea et al. v. Adkins et al.,
164 Ind. 580, 74 N. E. 242, 108 Am. St. Rep. 320, holds that, "The courts
give effect to the intent in deeds where it can be discovered and is not in
violation of the rules of law." To the same effect is Andrews v. Andrews,
31 Ind. App. 189, 67 N. E. 461, and Falley v. Giles, 29 Ind. 114.
T. L. JR.
NEGLIGENcE--TRuCK COLLISION-NEW TRLAL-DAMAGs.-Appeal from
a verdict for appellee. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn., was
joined with one Fisher as co-plaintiff in case below in Hamilton Circuit
Court. Complaint of appellees averred that on October 27th, 1922, Fisher
was driving an automobile truck, belonging to him, loaded with hogs, and
coming south on Range Line road, a paved public highway; that Hartford
Insurance Co. carried a policy of insurance on the truck against damage by
collision; that about 4:30 a. m. of said morning the truck of Fisher collided
with a truck then owned by appellant, and being operated by one of appellant's servants; that on said morning it was dark and foggy and difficult to
see; that truck of appellant was being driven north on the public highway
without any headlights on the truck, as required by law; that driver of
appellant's truck gave no signal or warning by bell or horn or other device
and by reason of such acts of negligence, and without fault or negligence on
part of Fisher, the trucks collided, whereby Fisher's truck was damaged.
Appellant's demurrer to the complaint was overruled as was also his motion for a new trial, held: There was no error in overruling the demurrer to the complaint nor the motion for a new trial. Maxwell Gravel
Co. v. Fisher et al., Indiana Appellate Ct., April 28, 1926.
Plaintiff must prove freedom from contributory negligence in action for
damages to personal property. Rhea v. Sawyer, 54 Ind. App. 512, 102 N.
E. 52; Steele v. City of Bloomington, 83 Ind. App. 73, 147 N. E. 718; Cincinnati, L. & A. Electric St. Ry. Co. v. Klump, 37 Ind. App. 660, 77 N. E.
869. Complaint in this case alleged, in a sufficient manner to avoid demurrer, that Fisher was free from contributory negligence. An automobile on a public highway at night should be equipped with lights to let
others know of its presence, and a failure to have such lights is legal negligence. Burns Indiana Statutes, 1926, Sec. 10129, and Indiana Law Journal,
1926, page 287; as well as negligence in fact; Wright v. Crane, 142 Mich.
508, 106 N. W. 71; Lauson v. Town of Fond Du Lao, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N. W.
629; Zoltovsk-i v. Gzella, 159 Mich. 620, 124 N. W. 527. Where co-plaintiffs
recover verdicts resting on different grounds, defendant's motion for a new
trial should be denied, unless directed to verdict which is not sustained by
evidence. In this case the evidence seems to support the verdict. The granting of a new trial lies largely in the discretion of the trial court. Cisco
& N. E. Ry. Co. v. Proctor, 272 S. W. 308; Mount Arbor Nurseries v. N. Y.
C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 273 S. W. 410. In an action for injuries to an automo-
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bile from collision, measure of damages is different between value of the
property before the damage and afterwards. Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v.
Molloy, 78 Ind. App. 72, 134 N. E. 912; Lamon v. Perry, 125 S. E. 907. In
action for negligent injury to automobile or truck, owner is entitled to
amount of damages to automobile or truck, and insurer to amount it is compelled to pay under its policy. Auto Owner's Protective Exchange v. Edwards, 82 Ind. App. 558, 136 N. E. 577; Underwriter'sExchange v. Indianapolis St. Ry. Co., Indiana Appellate Court, Mar. 12, 1925, 146 N. E. 860.
A. E. B.
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND ARREST-EVIDENC--INTOXICATWNG

LQUOR.-

The appellant, while riding in an automobile driven by his brother, was
followed by three police officers who accosted him when the car stopped.
The officers ordered the appellant out of the car; the appellant, taking a
half-pint bottle from his hip pocket, threw it on the floor of the car, breaking it. The officers testified the bottle contained white mule whiskey. At
the time of the arrest the officers had no knowledge that was a basis for
probable cause to search the appellant or his car. Neither the appellant
nor his brother testified as witnesses in the case and after conviction the
appellant moved for a new trial because:
(1) The court permitted evidence by the state that the appellant was reputed to be a bootlegger or was
a bootlegger, and also admitted evidence that appellant's brother was a bootlegger, or reputed to be a bootlegger; (2) The court permitted the officers
to testify what they saw, what they heard, and what they did while searching the automobile in which the appellant was riding, held: Judgment
reversed with instructions for a new trial. The reputation of the accused
is never in issue until so placed by the accused, hence it was error for the
court to permit evidence by the state reflecting upon the reputation of the
appellant or that of his brother. A peace officer may arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant only on view, hence the evidence given by the
officers should have been excluded. Edwards v. State, Supreme Court of
Indiana, decided June 24, 1926, 152 N. E. 721.
A peace officer may arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant only
on view, Doering v. State, 49 Ind. 56. The first offense against Indiana
Acts, C. 23, renders one liable for a fine and imprisonment in jail, hence is
classified as a misdemeanor. Property secured by search and seizure under
the pretext of a search warrant, which was invalid for any reason, cannot
be used as evidence against the defendant, Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91.
When the search is unlawful in its inception, it is not made lawful by what
was learned thereafter, Doncaster v. State, 151 N. E. 724. Unless the defendant introduces evidence to prove his character to be good, it cannot be
assailed by evidence on part of the prosecution, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Ex. 57. A witness cannot be impeached by proof of specific acts of
immorality, nor can proof be introduced by the state of special traits of
character of the defendant in a criminal case; unless defendant first puts
such traits of character in issue by the introduction of evidence as to his
general good character in that respect, Drew v. State, 124 Ind. 9. For the
purposes of the trial an alleged accomplice (App's brother) is a stranger
to the record, and his character is of no more importance than the character
of any other third person. Walls v. State, 125 Ind. 400. In the light of
the above cases, the decision of the Supreme Court appears to be a correct
R. W. M.
statement of the law.
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SUPREME COURT
24710 BURNETT ET Al. V. STATE. Marion County. Affirmed. Willoughby,
J. February 16, 1927.
Where an automobile truck is observed by officers to be loaded with cans
and packages and the odor of intoxicating liquor coming from the truck is
noticed by the officers, this is sufficient to indicate that a felony is being
perpetrated in their presence and they are authorized to make an arrest
without a warrant.
24936 EvANS v. STATE Vanderburgh County. Affirmed. Gemmill, C. J.
February 16, 1927.
Where newly discovered evidence in a murder case is not of such nature
as to be likely to produce a different verdict in a new trial, it is not error
for the court to refuse to grant a new trial on the grouhid of newly discovered evidence.
24535 FOUNTAIN PARK CoPANY v. HENSLER ET AL. Jasper County.
Affirmed. Martin, J. February 25, 1927.
It is unconstitutional to grant the power of eminent domain to a chautauqua corporation where that corporation is not compelled to serve the
public generally.
24090 FRITCH ET AL. V. STATE.

Brown County.

Affirmed.

Gemmill, C. J.

February 22, 1927.
Where it is alleged that a juryman is incompetent because of prejudice
before the trial, the court may try this question on affidavits and if there is
sufficient evidence to support the reasonable conclusion by the court, the
court's decision may not be reversed on appeal.
24661 JOHNSON V. STATE. Marion County. Reversed. Travis, J. February 17, 1927.
Where appellant was riding in an automobile in which liquor was being
transported, she could not be convicted under the prohibition laws where
no evidence was introduced in any way connecting her with the ownership
of the automobile, the ownership of the liquor, or the distribution of the
liquor.
25096 LINDLEY V. STATE.
1927.
Per Curiam.

Delaware County.

Per Curiam. February 16,

248T2 NAHAS V. STATE. Laporte County. Reversed. Myers, J. February 24, 1927.
Where a counsel for the defendant enters a plea of "guilty" without his
knowledge and judgment is given on this plea, it is incumbent on the trial
court to grant a new trial if it appears that the defendant really wished
to enter a plea of "not guilty."
25105 STATE Ex REL. SCHROEDER V. MORRIS, MAYOR, ET AL. Floyd County.
Reversed. Myers, J. February 18, 1927.
Where under section 10878 Burns, 1926, cities of over 15,000 are required
to divide the fire department force into two shifts for day and night duty,

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
this is a mandatory provision required by the legislature for the protection
of the welfare of the community and action will lie to compel the local officials to comply with this statute.
12696 BIEHL v. GUARANTY DISCOUNT CORPORATION.
Marion County.
Affirmed. Thompson, J. February 15, 1927.
Where a party agreed in court to waive a change of venue, and no additional facts are discovered upon which to predicate a later request for a
change of venue, then the waiver is binding on the parties and no change
of venue can be had.
12797 BOWEN & BARKER v. KoKomIo OMNIBUS COMPANY ET AL. Howard
County. Appeal Dismissed. McMahan, C. J. February 18, 1927.
Where one of the defendants in the trial court failed to file any pleadings whatever, a judgment sustaining the demurrer of the other defendants
does not apply to this defendant.
12587 BoxnLL ET AL. V. PAVEy.
February 1, 1927.
Per Curiam.

Delaware County.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam.

12714 BOYD ET AL. v. MICHAELS. Wells County. Reversed. McMahan,
C. J. February 3, 1927.
Where there is an agreement between stockholders to share in equal
proportion any sums paid by the stockholders by reason of borrowing
money from the bank, it must follow that all those who were stockholders
at the time of the agreement are bound thereby.
12475 BROWN ET AL. V. WABASH PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY. Huntington
County. Rehearing denied. McMahan, C. 3. February 17, 1927.
Where the verdict of the jury is not supported by sufficient evidence, the
trial court must grant a new trial.
12406 THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. Louis RY. Co. v.
BEM IENT-REA COMPANY.
Sullivan County. Petition for rehearing
de-nied. McMahan, C. J. February 1, 1927.
Where the original judgment of the court covers the facts that are relied
on in the petition for rehearing and no question of law is involved, there is
no ground for a re-hearing.
12643 GAry GARAGE & SALES CO. V. PEOPLES CO-OPERATIVE STATE BANK,
ADMINISTRATOR.
Lake County. Affirmed. Nichols, J.
February
18, 1927.
On proper facts a jury might find that a son had been emancipated
while his mother had not apparently relinquished her right to his service.
A general verdict will be sustained unless its result is clearly contradicted
by answers to special interrogatories.
12594 GASCO V. TRACAS. St. Joseph County. Reversed. Nichols, J. February 3, 1927.
Where an agency may not be proven by the testimony of the agent,
nevertheless the acts of an agent within his apparent authority in apparently employing another person may be given as evidence that there was
such employment and will be sufficient to establish such employment in the
absence of any contradictory evidence.
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12654 GENERAL HIGHWAYS SYSTEM, INC., V. THOMPSON, RECEIVE.

Van-

derburg County. Reversed. McMahan, C. J., Dissents. Nichols, J.
February 24, 1927.
A chattel mortgage permitting the mortgagor to remain in possession,
to sell and apply the proceeds or any part of them, to his own use is fraudulent and void in law as against creditors.
12589 HATFIELDr, TRUSTEE, V. RALSTON ET AL.
Vanderburgh County.
Affirmed. Nichols, J. February 18, 1927.
When leave to file a bill of exceptions granted at a time after the motion
for a new trial was overruled without authority at law, the statute expressly requires that the granting of such leave occur at the time of ruling of
the motion.
12511 HOFFMAN ET AL. v. ALFORD. Union County. Affirmed. McMahan,
C. J. February 23, 1927.
When the question of whether or not a party to an action may file a
verified answer is in the discretion of the court, then that discretion will
not be questioned on appeal in the absence of positive proof of abuse.
12463 LAY E;T AL. v. LAY ET AL. St. Joseph County. Affirmed. McMahan,
C. J. February 15, 1927.
Where under Section 551 Burns 1926, a witness is not competent to
testify as to certain matters, there is no error if the court refused to exercise further discretion in calling the witness anyway.
12449 LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT Co., LTD., V. OTIS ELEVATOR Co.
Marion County. Reversed. Nichols, J. February 3, 1927.
Where a company installs an elevator safety device and warrants it
against causing injuries, the company will be liable on its warrant so that
if the owner of the building responds in damages to one injured in the elevator, the owner of the safety device will be liable for the damages.
12647 MCGOLDRICI V. STATE EX REL. Wells County. Affirmed. McMahan,
C. J. February 1, 1927.
If there is evidence from which a jury might reasonably conclude that
appellant was the father of the child, then the jury may disregard other
witnesses and the testimony of experts who give contradictory evidence.
12607 McKINNEY ET AL. V. CRAWFORD.
Bartholomew County. Affirmed.
Nichols, J. February 3, 1927.
A justice of the peace has jurisdiction to try a case involving the holding
over of a tenant after the expiration of a lease.
12592 NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE INS. ASS'N. v. NARKERvIS.
Marion County.
Affirmed. Nichols, J. February 3, 1927.
Where it is essential to the case that an assignment be shown, it is sufficient if this appears from the evidence in the record.
12618 NICHOLSON, AUDITOR OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, INDIANA, V. CHAMBERLArN. Washington County. Reversed. Nichols, J.
February
18, 1927.
Where a state board of tax commissioners had jurisdiction to give a
re-assessment of appellee's property, it was proper for them to do so at any
regular meeting of the board and at adjourned meetings of the board without specific notice to the appellee of the times of these adjourned meetings.
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12619 NICHOLSON, AUDITOR OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, INDIANA, V. McCLIN-

TOCK. Washington County. Reversed. Nichols, J. February 18,
1927.
This case is reversed on the authority of Nicholson v. Chamberlain,
12618, Indiana Appellate Court.
12616 ROBERTSON ET AL. V. BURNETT ET AL. Sullivan County. Affirmed.
Nichols, J. February 4, 1927.
"Nephews" and "nieces" as legatees in a will will be construed to include grand-nephews and grand-nieces where this is clearly the intention of
the testator as found in the entire will.
12628 THE SHAW COAL COMPANY V. KOEHLER. Warrick County. Affirmed.
Nichols, J. February 4, 1927.
Where appellant presents no question in his pleadings, there is no ground
for the Appellate Court to change the judgment of the trial court.
12634 STATE v. KEPPFRT ET AL. Marion County. Affirmed. Nichols, J.
February 18, 1927.
Recognizance bonds given in criminal actions must be duly recorded if
they are to be liens on the real estate when they are judged forfeited.
12657 SULLIVAN V. WILSON ET AL. Marion County. Affirmed. McMahan,
C. J. February 16, 1927.
Where one party to a contract shows entire unwillingness to carry out
its terms, there may be such facts for the court to annul the contract.
12609 TERRE HAUTE, INDIANAPOLIS AND

Vermillion County.
Per Curiam.

Affirmed.

CO. V. S ms.
February 17, 1927.

EASTERN TRACTION

Per Curiam.

12480 THOMPSON V. THn TOWN OF FORT BRANCH. Gibson County. Petition for rehearing denied. Nichols, J. February 3, 1927.
If it is indicated to the jury that a parent suing for loss of services of a
child can only recover for the loss that he has sustained (and this means
the difference between the child's earnings and the expense of maintaining
the child until he is twenty-one years of age), then the instruction is correct
regardless of how the computation is made.
12620 THE TRUST & SAVINGS BANK OF RENSSELAER V. BRUSNAHAN, RECEIVER, ET AL. Newton County. Affirmed. Per Curiam. February
24, 1927.
Per Curiam.
12557 TURNER, ET AL., V. HENSHAW, RECEIVER. Marion County. Reversed.
Remy, J. February 16, 1927.
Where a note and mortgage are given to protect the policy holders but
are not given to the insurance company itself, the insurance company is
not authorized to enforce the note and the mortgage and hence a receiver
for the insurance company cannot regard the note and mortgage as general
assets of the corporation.
12414 UNION TRACTION CO., ET AL., V. CAMERON. Johnson County. Reversed. McMahon, C. J. February 25, 1927.
It is not necessarily reversible error for the trial court to give an instruction under which the jury might award the plaintiff damages for fur-
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ther medical expenses where the plaintiff is suing for loss of service of his
wife due to her injury by the defendant.
12390 WiL V. CITY OF MUNCIE, ET AL.

Delaware County.

Affirmed.

McMahan, C. J. February 2, 1927.
Where a court is sitting as a court of equity and gives its conclusions
of law bearing on a pending case, it is not error for the court to rpodify
these conclusions of law on its own motion any time before the final decree.
12604 WILLIAMSON HEATER Co. v. THE LAKE CO. PRINTING & PUBLISHING

Co. Lake County. Affirmed. Per Curiam. February 24, 1927.
Per Curiam.

